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A PRACTICING LAWYER LOOKS AT THE LABOR BOARD t
by
Joseph A. Jenkins*

A

N attorney in private practice is often perplexed by this ques-

tion: why do some cases before the National Labor Relations
Board take so long to decide? Since the same problem had troubled me
before I came to Washington as a member of the Board, I resolved to
find out just what happens to a case when it gets up to the Board. This
article passes on something of what I have learned since March 28
of this year, when I was sworn in as a member. I intended to
demonstrate in some detail the manner and amount of time and
attention devoted to cases that are contested up to Board decision.
It is a hoary truism that time is of the first importance in labormanagement relations. So, as a point of departure in this look at the
Washington operations, it seemed a good idea to check on the time
element in a few cases. The writer participated in his first two decisions on March 29th. For that reason those first two cases are chosen
as a point of departure in examining Washington operations. While
neither of these cases turned out to be "average" cases in the statistical sense, they do seem to be fairly typical of Board operations. One
was an election case, and the other a secondary boycott case.
The election case was with the agency 133 days from the time
the petition was filed until the Board issued its decision directing
an election. However, for 20 days of this time, the case was more
or less in cold storage while unfair labor practice charges which had
been filed against the employer after the representation hearing were
investigated. The charges were dismissed by the General Counsel, so
the case rolled on through the mill. But the question of primary
interest was: How long was the case before the five-member Board?
Counting from the time the case was actually assigned to a Board
member (after the changes had been dismissed), 58 days elapsed
before the Board's formal decision was mailed to the parties. However, it should be noted that this case reversed an earlier precedent
and laid down a new rule on bargaining units in wholesale operations. Breaking these 58 days down a bit further, 45 days were occupied in analyzing the issues in the record, reaching the initial decision by the five members, preparing a draft opinion, and circulatt Based on remarks before the Sixth Labor Law Institute of the Southwestern Legal
Foundation, Dallas, Texas, on April 25, 1957.
*Member, National Labor Relations Board.
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ing the draft among the Board members. Eleven days later, all five
Board members had approved the draft and two days later the decision issued.
The secondary boycott case was technically pending before the
Board in Washington 133 days. That dates from the day the trial
examiner issued his Intermediate Report and Recommended Order.
Thirty-one days later the parties had filed their exceptions and brief.
The case was then ripe for the process of decision, but it hit a snag.
It was 69 days before a Board legal assistant was available to begin
work on it. Thereafter, 64 days elapsed between the time the actual
work of deciding the case began and the issuance of decision. Of
these 64 days, it took 44 days for reading the record, making a decision by the Board members and preparing a draft opinion in accordance with that decision. Twenty days after the draft opinion was
circulated among the Board members and the decision issued. In
connection with this case, it is an interesting sidelight to note the
time which elapsed in the collateral proceeding for the injunction
which the statute requires to be sought on secondary boycott complaints. This proceeding in the federal district court extended over
136 days, from the filing of the petition to the court's decision on
the issue of whether there was reasonable cause to believe that the
union had violated the Taft-Hartley Act.
Of course, neither of these cases is yet closed. The election ordered still must be held. And, it is possible that it might yet spawn
a flock of objections. The Board's order in the secondary boycott
case has to be compiled with or enforcement sought in the courts.
Also, as before mentioned, these are not exactly "average" cases in
terms of time. A check of official statistics shows a median average in
1956 for an unfair labor practice case was just a trifle under 365 days
from filing of the charge to a Board decision, compared with 281
days for the secondary boycott case discussed above. Moreover, the statute requires that a priority be given to the investigation of boycott
cases. On representation cases, the average for 1956 was about 90
days from petition to decision. Of course, both these average figures
pertain to contested cases that are carried up to the Board in Washington, not those that are settled or disposed of in the field.
In mentioning these figures of days and months, I would not want
to leave you with a picture of the four Board members who were
then on the job as sitting around in their swivel chairs waiting for
these two cases to come to the boil of decision. For example, they
handled a few other matters during the 133 days that the boycott
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case was in Washington. They issued decisions in 469 contested cases
and in 169 others requiring formal Board decisions-a total of 638
cases in which the litigants had piled up a mere 113,642 pages of
transcript, not counting the briefs, exceptions, and such supplemental
reading material. Also during this same period, the Board members
had their free time to deal with the usual run-of motions for reconsideration and the varied procedural matters that counsel, statutory
requirements and administrative due process can raise.
Having waded through this swamp of statistics, let us come a few
steps more on the dry land of Board case-handling procedure. The
grand central station for cases coming to the five-member Board
in Washington is the Executive Secretary's office. He is the Board's
equivalent of a clerk of the court. But he has more responsibility
for getting the cases through to decision than a court clerk .ordinarily has. One of his minor jobs is assigning cases-"minor" because cases usually are assigned to the Board members by rotation.
But when a case arrives in the Executive Secretary's office, it is seldom, if ever, ready for assignment because of the pending backlog.
An unfair labor practice case is transferred to the Board when the
trial examiner issues his Intermediate Report. Of course, at that time,
it cannot be known whether the case will ever be assigned to the
Board members for decision; however, most of them are. Only about
12 percent of the unfair labor practice cases that are carried to a
hearing stop with the parties' acceptance of the trial examiner's
findings. So, the case has to await assignment until the General Counsel or the other parties file exceptions and supporting briefs. This
seldom takes less than the 20 days allowed by the statute and sometimes takes considerably more as extensions of time are sought and
granted for valid reasons.
At the first of this month, for .example, the Board had 270 cases
on assignment to the Board members and an additional 131 cases
ready and waiting assignment. Fifty-one more were on hand but not
yet ready for assignment, and 15 of these were unfair labor practice
cases which were expected to be closed by compliance with the trial
examiners' recommendations.
Technically a case goes from the Executive Secretary to a Board
member. Actually it goes to a legal assistant of the member. Each
member has a staff of legal assistants; currently about 14 are attached to each member. As the rest of the world, they are divided
into Indians and chiefs. Each Board member has a chief legal assistant and usually two or three supervisors. The rest are what might
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be called the frontline Indians. They are the men and women who
have the job of wading through all the pages of transcript and briefs
to find the pertinent parts and the essence of the case. As they go
along, guided by the supervisors, they sort out the simple and the
complex, the hard and the easy, the points that are well settled from
those that have never been tackled before. After they have determined the issues of the case, they must seek out the law covering
these points. Once in a while in their researches they may find two
Board decisions on the same point which might be said to be inconsistent with each other. And, it is told, they are not shy about pointing out these apparent inconsistencies to the Board members.
The fruit of this effort is a case analysis memorandum, usually as
short as a brief and similarly interlaced with citations to the record,
the briefs and the books. This memorandum, accompanied by the
record, the briefs and the other supplemental reading matter, makes
its way up through the supervisor and the chief legal assistant to
the desk of the Board member. After the Board member has digested this material, there is ordinarily a case conference consisting
of the legal assistant, his supervisor, the chief legal assistant and the
Board member. The member, if satisfied, approves the memorandum
for circulation to the other Board members. It is then that the real
job of deciding the case begins.
After the individual members have had time to digest the case,
it then goes on the Board's case agenda for concerted consideration.
These meetings, customarily called three days a week, are marked
by a thorough and exhaustive discussion of the case and its issues
and exchange of views. This is the time of decision, and the discussion culminates in the vote of the Board members. The legal assistant assigned to the case and his supervisor and the chiefs are
present for this discussion. The legal assistant notes the reasoning
upon which the case is decided, and prepares a draft of an opinion
accordingly. Occasionally, one or two members may disagree with
the majority's decision or its rationale. The dissenting member then
has one of his legal assistants prepare a draft of a dissenting opinion
for approval. The dissenting opinion, of course, also circulates to all
Board members. On some occasions such dissents have been so powerful as to dissolve the original majority into a dissenting minority.
But doubtless the dissenting members rarely hope for so much. The
great bulk of decisions are unanimous.
This obviously is a time-consuming process. As a consequence,
the Board follows it only in cases which present novel, important or
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difficult issues. Otherwise, the five-member Board would never be
able to keep up with its caseload, which requires it to turn out decisions in more than 110 contested cases every 20 regular working
days. One shortcut that the Board employs in cases which appear
to be clearly controlled by well-established precedent is to have the
legal assistant draft a tentative opinion under his individual member's
direction instead of a case analysis memorandum. In representation
cases, this has been carried a step further in what Board personnel
call the "short form." This is a form on which has been printed the
stock language of Board decisions with space provided for typing
in the specific data relating to the particular case.
But probably the most important step the Board has taken to
expedite cases was the establishment of five three-member panels, as
permitted under the National Labor Relations Act. Each member is
chairman of a panel. While each panel meets, the two remaining
members are free to study cases for the Board's case agenda and his
own panel and to carry on other necessary business of his office. Meanwhile, the process of deciding cases goes forward. However, here, as
with all the other shortcuts, any Board member has the power in any
case to call it up for consideration at an agenda meeting of the full
Board. The panels handle most of the cases which are clear-cut enough
to be prepared originally in draft form rather than dealt with by the
memorandum process.
But even with these aids and shortcuts in paperwork, a Board
member has indeed a full day. Not only is it necessary to study the
essential papers of the cases with great care and consult frequently
with his legal assistants but it is a great necessity to consult informally
with fellow Board members in order to understand their points of
view and to get the benefit of their thinking on the broad matters
of policy and administration.
Board members do not work a 40-hour week. Usually it is necessary to take a briefcase full of papers home at night in order to have
an opportunity to go over the Intermediate Reports and various
briefs involved. Considering the vastness of the territory covered,
the number of cases involved, and the complexities of the issues,
the Board is doing a fair job of turning out its cases. Nevertheless,
it is constantly seeking ways and means of improving production
while at the same time maintaining a high quality of work. Its policy
is to turn out cases as fast as time permits, considering the built-in
delays in the form of time for filing briefs, etc., and considering the
limited funds and personnel at its disposal.
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The mention of policy leads into another topic which is the subject of much discussion in Washington. That is the matter of the
Board's jurisdiction. There is a good deal of interest and concern
among labor lawyers as to the impact and implication of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in the case of Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd.' and its companion cases.! This is no less true in Washington.
As to the scope of these preemption decisions, attention is called
to the first appraisal of them by a state court. The opinion was that
of a trial court in Illinois, where the judge said in a picketing case
involving a retail automobile dealers' association:
It is my opinion from a reading of these cases that the entire field
is preempted by Congress; it is preempted and the state courts lack
jurisdiction. I think that the National Labor Management Act provides a comprehensive system for dealing with labor relations and dealing with unfair labor practices affecting interstate commerce. 3
The Judge went on to say:
I think the National Labor Relations Board, either directly or indirectly, controls all the alleged unfair labor practices that are alleged
here and has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the issues in controversy. The questions of picketing, boycott activities, secondary boycott,
consumer pressure and economic pressure for the purpose of obtaining
recognition or union shop agreements, are, in my opinion, either directly or indirectly recognized and dealt with by the national act.4
From some experience in dealing with the uncertainties of legal
interpretation, the writer will not undertake at this time to say
whether this state court's reading of the Guss case defines with precision either way the reaches of the Supreme Court's opinion. Also,
in delving into this highly controversial field, it is not intended to
speak in any way for the other members of the National Labor
Relations Board. This discussion will be confined merely to mentioning some of the possible avenues of dealing with the "no man's
land" which the Supreme Court found to exist between the present
federal field of activity and the limits of state power to act.

There appear to be four major alternatives:
1. Congress can act to reduce the area of federal preemption.
2. The Board itself can lower its jurisdictional standards to extend

its field of action.
177 Sup. Ct. 598 (1957).
'Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 77
Sup. Ct. 604 (1957); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 77 Sup. Ct. 607 (1957).
'Puckett Buick Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 39 LRRM 2753, 2754
(Ill. Cir. Ct., Knox County, April 8, 1957).
4Id.
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3. The "no man's land" can continue pending legislative or administrative action.
4. The States can act to fashion statutory machinery so that the

Board can, within the limitations of the existing federal law, cede
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court made it amply clear in the Guss opinion that

the only thing decided in these cases was that Congress had occupied
and thereby preempted the field of labor-management activities
covered by the Taft-Hartley Act when such activities affect interstate
commerce. The Court also made it equally clear that Congress could,
if it chose, reduce the extent of its preemption. The Court noted that
"Congress is free to change the situation at will." In this situation,
it seems to me that Congress, if it wishes to act, has at least four
choices:
First, it could declare the states free to act whenever the national
Board declines to assert jurisdiction.
Second, it could permit such state action if consistent with the
federal law.
Third, Congress could empower the national Board to cede jurisdiction to the states in certain cases without the current requirement
of consistency.
Fourth, it could define the federal jurisdiction more precisely, and
expressly leave the remainder of the field to the states.
If there is no action by Congress, the national Board must ultimately decide whether or not it should take any action. The Board,
of course, could lower its standards for asserting jurisdiction. However, this might raise one of two problems, or perhaps both of them:
the Board's handling of cases would be slowed down by the influx
of new cases; or it would be necessary for.-the Board to go to Congress for additional funds to handle the added load of cases.
One of the principal evils of delay in law administration, of course,
is that it actually weakens the force of the law. One party or another in effect often loses his rights by the long delay in their vindication. So, if delay in adjudication were the only problem arising
from a lowering of the Board's jurisdictional standards, it has been
suggested that this might be counteracted by wider use of the Board's
discretionary power to seek federal court injunctions against conduct which the General Counsel has denominated an unfair labor
practice in a formal complaint.
Which of these four major alternatives will be followed is not
known. However, this much is certain: to some managements and
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employees of companies which are too big for state and simultaneously too small for federal coverage the current situation may well
prove unbearable. For example, the Illinois case referred to earlier
involved 10 retail automobile dealers and two labor organizations
which have been embroiled in a labor dispute marked by picketing
since May, 1956.
If the Board lowers its jurisdictional standards, will it be able to
act on time to extend the benefits of the statute to small employers
plagued by secondary boycotts, or act on time to guard the rights
of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act?
The jurisdictional problem is one of grave national concern, and
it is important that it be worked out satisfactorily, as its solution will
have a profound and lasting impact upon the lives of the citizens
of these United States.

